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THE INCARNATION AS ACTION COMPOSITE
Katherin A. Rogers

The Council of Chalcedon insisted that God Incarnate is one person with two
natures, one divine and one human. Recently critics have rightly argued that
God Incarnate cannot be a composite person. In the present paper I defend a
new composite theory using the analogy of a boy playing a video game. The
analogy suggests that the Incarnation is God doing something. The Incarnation is what I label an “action composite” and is a state of affairs, constituted
by one divine person assuming human nature. This solves a number of puzzles, conforms to Chalcedon, and is logically and metaphysically consistent.

I. Introduction
Christian tradition, established at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, insists
that some things must be said concerning the Incarnation and some things
must not be said. And some philosophers have argued that what the tradition says must be said, cannot be said coherently. Chalcedon insisted that
God Incarnate is one person with two natures, one divine and one human,
the latter consisting of a human soul and body. One way of trying to
render this coherent is to portray the Incarnation as a sort of composite—
the Word plus the assumed human nature. But this composite theory has
recently come under attack.1 The criticism is aimed at attempts to see God
Incarnate as a composite person. But the person who is the Word—though
He has two natures when Incarnate—cannot possibly be a composite
person. Here I defend a new composite theory using the analogy of a boy
playing a video game. The analogy suggests a way of thinking about the
Incarnation as what I will label an “action composite” which conforms to
Chalcedon and is logically and metaphysically consistent.
Chalcedon describes the Incarnation this way:
[W]e all with one voice teach the confession of one and the same Son, our
Lord Jesus Christ: the same perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the
same truly God and truly man, of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial
with the Father as regards his divinity, and the same consubstantial with
us as regards his humanity; like us in all respects except for sin; begotten
before the ages from the Father as regards his divinity, and in the last days

1
Robin Le Poidevin, “Identity and the Composite Christ; An Incarnational Dilemma,”
Religious Studies 45 (2009), 167–186; Thomas Senor, “The Compositional Account of the
Incarnation,” Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007), 52–71.
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the same for us and for our salvation from Mary, the virgin God-bearer as
regards his humanity; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten,
acknowledged in two natures which undergo no confusion, no change, no
division, no separation; at no point was the difference between the natures
taken away through the union, but rather the property of both natures is
preserved and comes together into a single person and a single subsistent
being; he is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same
only-begotten Son, God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ.2

How could a single person have a divine and a human nature? Don’t
humanity and divinity possess opposing properties? A standard move
is to attribute some properties to Christ as divine and some as human.3
So Christ is x qua God, but not-x, qua man. And one way to elaborate is
to propose that God Incarnate is (something like) a composite. Call the
Second Person of the Trinity, thought of as temporally (quoad nos) or causally or logically preceding the Incarnation, “W” for Word. W assumes
human nature by “adding” on to Himself a human body and soul. Call
the composite of the Word assuming the human soul and body, the Word
Incarnate or WI. The composite, WI, consists of (at least) two concrete particulars, W and the organic unity of the human soul and body. Let H stand
for this organic unity.4
In many cases of composites there is nothing puzzling in saying, “this
part is x, and this part is not-x.” A ball may be half white and half black.
Sometimes we say of a composite whole that it is x because a part of it is x.
An apple is “red” even though the flesh is white. Can we solve the puzzle
about opposing properties in WI by appealing to its composite status?
So we might say that the divine part is omniscient and the human part
not-omniscient. But there is only one person in WI, and critics argue that
the composite proposal fails to do justice to Chalcedon. Both critics and
defenders have tended to appeal to examples drawn from material composites in setting out and criticizing the theory. I propose that examining a
different sort of composite, an action composite, provides a better (though
very distant) analogy for the Incarnation, one which is not susceptible to
the recent criticisms.
II. A Video Game Analogy
The composite is Nick Playing (NP), a boy playing a video game.5 Nick
(N), the actual boy sitting in front of the screen, is analogous to W. He
is playing a character—a moving human-shaped image on the screen—
which we can call “Nick’s Character” (NC). NC is analogous to H, the
Available at http://www.piar.hu/councils/ecum04.htm.
See the letter of Pope Leo the Great which is attached as an addendum to the Council’s
statement. Latin text can be found in the Patrologia Latina Cursus Completus Vol. 54, 755–782.
4
The Christian tradition insists on the union of soul and body in the human person, so
best to consider soul and body one thing.
5
I proposed this in “Incarnation” in Christian Philosophical Theology, ed. Charles Taliaferro
and Chad Meister (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 95–107.
2
3
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human body and soul of WI. Nick’s activity of “playing” is analogous to
the divine act of “assuming.” Nick’s game is a First Person Player game
where the player sees the action in the first person, for example seeing
only his own virtual arms and hands and (occasionally) feet and legs. If
there are other players, they see the character from a third person perspective as a whole figure. NP, then, is N playing NC, and is analogous to WI.
Is NP just an updated version of JM, Jim Marionetting (if that is the
word I want)? Not at all. As I defend the video game analogy, I will point
out multiple ways in which NP is helpful where JM is not. To my knowledge, our predecessors did not adopt anything like a JM analogy, and it
will be easy to see why.6 There is one obvious difference that it will be well
to mention here at the beginning. Jim’s marionette is a three-dimensional
object in our physical world. NC exists in what may be thought of as a
different world, Nick’s Game World (NGW). NGW is an intelligently designed system which is constituted by a set of mutually consistent rules,
different from the natural laws which govern our physical universe, and
different from those governing other video games. NGW is not entirely
self-contained, in that it can be accessed from outside, but only by beings
who exist on the same plane and with much of the same knowledge and
many of the same abilities as the makers of the game. NGW does exist
within our physical world, but the “objects” in it, the characters, the trees,
the weaponry, are two-dimensional. Splendid as NGW may be, it is incomparably less rich—less complex, less detailed, less full of being—than
our physical world. So NGW is a created world in which its makers can
act, but which has a “thinner” sort of existence than its makers and the
world they inhabit. In thinking about the Incarnation, NGW serves as an
analogy for our physical world. NP can act in NGW as NC, and WI can
act in the physical world as H. The stage “world” of the marionette is
just a part of our three-dimensional world. So NGW makes a much better
analogy than the puppet stage for our physical world in relationship to
God, and NP makes a better analogy than JM.
Before developing the analogy, two preliminary points: First, it might be
objected that NP is not sufficiently unified to count as a composite whole.
But mereologists have achieved no consensus on how much of what sort of
unity—if any—it takes to be one being. I do not propose any overarching
mereological theories, but rather say just enough to motivate my analogy
and defend my composite theory. My guiding principle is that any mereological claim that entails the falsehood of the Chalcedonian statement is to
be rejected. Assuming Chalcedonian Christology, something which is one
in terms of being a person can have two radically different and separate
natures. NP has a sort of unity, to be discussed below, and for purposes of
the analogy, it should prove sufficient. Secondly, NP—Nick playing NC—
6
Richard Cross, the author of The Metaphysics of the Incarnation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) in correspondence supports my impression that the Medievals, at least, did
not propose the puppet analogy.
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is better labeled a state of affairs than a person or an object. If the analogy
is apt, this suggests that the Incarnation is properly thought of as (or as
something like) a state of affairs. So if the Incarnation is to be thought of
as a composite, it is not a composite person or a composite object. It is a
composite state of affairs composed of the concrete particulars W and H,
and also the features they exhibit, and the relations among them.
The analogy suggests at least six important points which contemporary
literature on the metaphysics of the Incarnation often fails to appreciate.7
First, the analogy appeals to a composite involving a person, which is
useful in that the Chalcedonian issue is whether or not a single person can
be the main constituent of a composite with two natures.8 Secondly, the
divine and human natures, dimly reflected in the actual boy and the video
game character, occupy different “orders” of being. N is far less limited
than NC, which exists only as the character played by N and so is utterly
dependent on N. By “utterly dependent” I mean more than that NC could
not be part of NP without N and that NC could not be doing what it is
doing if it were not part of NP. NC is a first-person character and so would
not exist at all if it were not part of NP. In this, NC is quite unlike N, who
exists whether playing or not. Thus the analogy (distantly) mirrors the
classical theism which undergirds Chalcedon; there is a radical difference
in the ontological status of God and the human being. God is the absolute Existent on which all else depends, such that creatures have a “thin”
and reflected sort of being. Those who eschew that language can still appreciate the radical difference between God, the source of all, Who keeps
everything that is not Himself in being from moment to moment, and the
creature which exists in absolute dependence on the Creator. Here we see
one reason why JM fails as an analogy. M, the marionette, exists as a separate, three-dimensional object in the physical world just the same way that
J, the man, does. The marionette exists in the same way even when it sits
on the shelf and no one is using it. M is not utterly dependent on J, and the
relationship between J and M does not point towards existence in different
orders of being. But the two-dimensionality and the utter dependence of
NC on N suggest the radical ontological separation of God and man.
The ontological distance is helpful in seeing how two things can be one.
Two things occupying the same “order of being” must be distinguished
within that same order, and thus their “twoness” seems less amenable to
allowing the sort of interrelationship which the Incarnation suggests. If we
posit two boys playing video games, and then propose that the two boys are
7
Some of the following points are mentioned briefly in my “An Anselmian Defense of the
Incarnation” in Debating Christian Theism, ed. Chad Meister, J. P. Moreland, and Khaldoun
Swies, forthcoming from Oxford University Press
8
The council’s term was the Greek hypostasis, translated as persona in Latin. The term connotes something a bit thinner, especially in terms of psychology, than does the contemporary
use of “person.” For the meaning of “hypostasis” in the Chalcedonian context see Brian E.
Daley, SJ, “Nature and the ‘Mode of Union’: Late Patristic Models for the Personal Unity of
Christ” in The Incarnation, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Danial Kendall, SJ, and Gerald O’Collins, SJ
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 164–196.
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really one being, we must reconcile the unity with whatever individuated
the two. Nick and his friend DJ are each constituted by the organic unity
of a human soul and body. What grounds their being individuals distinct
from one another is something about (or present in or attached to) their
each being a human soul and body. If we say that they are somehow really
one Nick-DJ being, we need to show how the ordinarily-individuatingsomething is inoperant in this case. And the same for JM. With two obviously discreet “parts” of the same order of being—two physical objects—
it is difficult to see how JM could achieve the sort of unity required for an
apt analogy for WI. (More on this below.)9 In NP as in WI we do not have
this difficulty.
Thirdly, based on the ontological distance and the dependence relationship, there is a thoroughgoing causal asymmetry regarding the two particulars in WI which is reflected in NP. W is He “through Whom all things
are made.” Classical theism holds that everything that exists, including
H, is caused immediately by W. In NP, NC is a first-person character, so
NC exists and does what it does only because it is being played by N. If
W were (per impossibile) to stop causing H, H would blink out of being.
And if N stops playing NC, NC does not exist. Again, JM fails. M does not
depend causally upon J for its existence from moment to moment. J might
cease to exist and M could be unaffected.
Of course, there is an important disanalogy between N and W as
causes. Unlike W, N must make use of all sorts of things outside himself
and independent of his causal activity in order to play NC. The video
game analogy can be improved if we add that N is the master of the
game. He can turn it on and off, and can change, including adding and
subtracting, elements in the game almost at will. But even still N must
use all the equipment. And even if he could dispense with the physical
equipment and exercise his mastery in the game simply by wishing, he
would still be operating with preexistent concepts of things which exist
independently of N. W is different. Classical theism as represented by
Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, has it that there are no concrete beings
and no abstracta (no necessary propositions, Middle Knowledge, or whatever) independent of God’s nature and will. All necessary truth exists as
an “extension” of the nature of God. All contingent things (with the possible exception of human choices) exist because they are willed to do so
by God. God is an absolute creator. The most brilliant human “creator” is
just rearranging what is given in the world. So N’s causal efficacy is just
the barest reflection of W’s. Still NP succeeds in pointing out an important
aspect of the Incarnation which is that one part of the composite is utterly
causally dependent on the other.
9
Perhaps it can be done. Ockham, apparently, held that each and every created substance
of one kind “has the metaphysical possibility of being an ‘alien’ supposit for a created individual substance nature of another kind.” Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ and Horrors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 135. But the thought that Socrates might take on
cow nature and be “inbovined” is deeply puzzling.
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Regarding the causal asymmetry in the parts of NP and WI, it should be
noted that N’s behavior regarding playing the game, even if we suppose
that N brings NC into being just by wishing, is circumscribed by the nature of NC. So, for example, if NC has a virtual human body, it can run and
shoot a gun in NGW. But NC cannot both remain NC and step out of the
screen. It cannot be a virtual bomb to be exploded on a virtual target. N
could replace NC with a bomb, but the bomb is not the same thing NC is.
That means that there is some mutual causal interdependence between N
and NC. N’s actions involving NC are somewhat limited by the nature of
NC. The same is true of W and H in WI. The H part of WI cannot be what
it is if it does not conform to human properties. So W’s willing is limited
regarding H. But N’s limitations regarding NC come ultimately from outside of himself. Even if N brings NGW and NC into being by wishing, N
must nonetheless wish for the instantiation of preexistent natures, properties, and relations which are not dependent upon him. God is an absolute
creator. If He chooses to become incarnate, then He is choosing to limit
Himself in ways which all ultimately depend upon Him. So the causal
asymmetry in the two parts of WI is more complete than in NP.
Fourth, the analogy underscores the important point that the Incarnation is God doing something. NP is an “action composite.” It is a composite
in that it involves at least two concrete particulars, N and NC. But it is
unified in that NC is a necessary element in the agent N’s doing what
he is doing. So an action composite has one particular which is an agent
and another particular (or other particulars—we will stick with one other
for simplicity’s sake) which are distinguishable from the agent, through
which the agent is doing what he is doing. To clarify, take a different action composite, the aforementioned Jim Marionetting. If Jim is asleep and
the marionette is sitting on a shelf, there is no JM. There is no marionetting going on, so no Jim Marionetting. Some mereologists hold that any
combination of things can be an object. If so, J sleeping and M sitting on
a shelf can together constitute an object, but this object is not JM. This extremely liberal mereology strikes me as counterintuitive, but in any case,
it seems safe to say that, whether or not Jim asleep and the marionette on
a shelf constitute an object, the action composite, JM, is significantly more
unified. It is characterized by an obvious principle of unity in that it is the
marionette’s presence as the kind of thing it is which allows Jim to engage
in the action which is required for the being of JM. M in JM is integrally
related to J’s activity in a way that M on a shelf is not. Though note that,
given the point above about different orders of being, it seems right to
say that JM is a less unified composite being than NP. J and M are of the
same order of being. They both exist as three-dimensional beings in our
physical universe, and M can exist without being part of JM, so M and J
seem less unified in JM than NC and N in NP.
If WI is (or is like) a composite, it is not a composite where the two
parts can equally “sit there” like a cat with its tail. W engages in (in fact,
on traditional Classical theism, He is) the pure act which keeps all things,
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including H, in being from moment to moment. In the simple act by which
God does all He does, W causes the existence of all there is and—a different
aspect of that one act—assumes H. To underscore, the Incarnation is the
Word doing something. An action composite like NP or WI is a composite
state of affairs which comes into being due to the action of an agent. It is
appropriate, then, to say that the agent is the main constituent of the state
of affairs. Nick is the main constituent of Nick Playing and the Word is the
main constituent of the Word Incarnate.
Fifth, given that NC is N’s first-person character, NC exists only when
N is playing it and only as the first-person character N is playing. (DJ
cannot “take over” the character. If DJ plays a first-person character it
is DJC, not NC.) There may be other characters in the game played by
other actual human beings, or characters that exist as non-playable characters—characters which exist in the game but cannot be controlled by
any actual human players. But NC just is the character N is playing. Talk
of what NC would be and do were N not playing it is simply incoherent.
So NC is unlike the marionette which can exist with or without JM. Again,
NP is a more unified composite than JM. If NC is not part of NP, NC
does not exist in any way at all. Analogously, H exists only as the human
nature of WI.
In the contemporary literature it is sometimes supposed that there is
some separate and discreet preexistent human individual which the Word
adds to Himself. But no. That has unacceptable consequences. However
we develop the relevant notion of personhood, at the very least, in the context of classical and medieval philosophy, it is a principle of individuality.
If P is a person, and then loses his personhood (whatever that may mean),
then P ceases to be the individual that he was and this would constitute
a genuine loss. So if W were to assume a preexistent person, that would
mean either that there are now two persons in the Incarnation, or that this
separate individual, a “suppositum,” the ultimate subject of properties,
was destroyed by being assumed.10 Even discussion of what status the
human body and soul would have if they were not assumed is incoherent.
H just is the human soul and body assumed by the Word and existing
as part of WI. Yes, other human persons are constituted by a soul and
body, but it does not follow that H in WI is, or even could be, a person or
anything at all, distinct from WI.11
This leads to a sixth advantage. NC serves as a representative or expression of N in NGW. If DJ is playing a character, it is possible that from some
perspectives—that of an onlooker in the real world who can see only the
screen or, to adopt a fantasy hypothesis, of another character in NGW—it
The latter is Thomas Aquinas’s argument in ST III, q.4, art.5.
This point also counts against the Molinist approach in which a possible person who is
the subject of true counterfactuals of freedom might or might not be “assumed” by the Word.
See Thomas P. Flint, “Molinism and Incarnation,” in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, ed.
Ken Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 187–207. A discussion of this issue lies
outside the scope of the present paper.
10
11
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appears to be the same character as NC. But it is not. If DJ is playing a firstperson character, then, even if he is playing it in NGW, the game world
designed and produced by Nick, DJ can play only DJC, an expression or
representative of DJ. With the Incarnation, H is all that is perceivable to
the human beings fortunate enough to come into physical contact with
that part of WI. But H, as part of WI, should be understood to express or
represent W. The thought is that our physical world is so limited that, in
order to reach us and address us in a special way, as one of us, W enters
into physical creation as WI. This underscores again the weakness of JM
as an analogy. Jim and his marionette are always equally and only present
in the physical world. There is no issue of J entering into a world with different properties in order to address his audience in a way which would
otherwise be impossible. If J wants to talk to the audience face to face, he
can just jump onto the stage. Of course, God can speak out of a burning
bush or in all sorts of ways large and small. But if He wants to address us
as a fellow citizen of our world, then Incarnation looks to be the move to
make. And so the NP analogy is valuable. N as NP enters NGW through
NC. Neat.
III. Defending the Composite
With the analogy spelled out, we can turn to the recent criticisms of the
composite theory to see if my suggestion of WI as an action composite can
withstand them. (The following is not intended to criticize the arguments
of Senor and LePoidevin insofar as they address the standard composite
theory that holds that God Incarnate is (like) a composite object or person.
My hope is that my proposal of a different sort of composite can avoid the
criticisms.) Thomas Senor, explicating compositional accounts offered by
Leftow and Stump, explains that, “The CA [compositional account] claims
that God the Son [W in my abbreviation] is one part of the composite
that is God Incarnate.” But then the question arises, “[I]s God the Son
identical to God Incarnate?” He identifies God Incarnate as Jesus Christ
and argues that if God the Son is but a proper part of Jesus Christ, then
God the Son and Jesus Christ are not identical. And if God the Son and
Jesus Christ are not identical, “then either Nestorianism is true and there
are two persons in the incarnation, or God Incarnate—Jesus Christ—is
not a person.”12 Appeal to my analogy as an action composite can avoid
this conclusion.
There are many different senses of “identity.” Our question, the Chalcedonian question, has to do with personal identity. God the Son and God
Incarnate must be numerically the same person. The question of personal
identity is a difficult one, and there is no consensus among philosophers.
Happily, we do not need to propose an analysis of personal identity. Taking
the Chalcedonian statement as our framework, we need achieve only the
modest goal of showing the bare possibility of a single being existing as
12

Senor, “Compositional Account,” 55–56.
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one person having two natures. The issue is not identity understood as
Leibnizian indiscernibility wherein x and y are said to be identical if, for
every property F, x has F if and only if y has F. Obviously some x and some
y may exhibit radically different properties and yet be the same person.
Perhaps x is you at age ten, and y is you at age fifty. Perhaps x is you sitting, and y is you standing. Perhaps x is you throughout your existence,
considered in abstraction from you reading right now, and y is you considered only as you read right now.
As I have spelled it out, WI is not a person, but a state of affairs. So W is
not the same person as WI, since WI is not a person. W is the same person
as W in WI, the agent who is the main constituent, and the only person, in
WI. The analogous version of Senor’s question regarding N and NP should
be: Is N the same person as the agent who is the main constituent of NP
and the only person to constitute a part of NP? Call N when considered as
part of NP, N in NP. Call Nick simpliciter, that is Nick considered in himself
whether or not he is playing the video game, NS. NS is not identical to
N in NP in some Leibnizian sense. NS and N in NP can exhibit different
properties. For example, NS might or might not be playing a video game,
whereas N in NP must be playing a video game. NS is not necessarily a
part of something of which NC is a part, whereas N in NP is. But are NS
and N in NP the same person? Well, it would be peculiar to say that Nick
is no longer a person or has become a different person just because he is
playing a video game. So the part of NP that is N is surely a person and
the same person he was before becoming part of NP. NP is constituted by
at least one person, then.
Does the presence of NC in NP add a new person? No. NC is just the
video game character played by Nick, so NC is not a person in his own
right. This would be the case even on the fantastical hypothesis that video
game characters can be persons. For the sake of the analogy imagine—if
you can—that video game characters have conscious experience with
some degree of reasoning capacity and free agency. And suppose that
the non-playable characters are little, individual, two-dimensional persons, call them digital persons or DPs. On this story, the behavior of the
DPs, which we 3-D folks thought was simply the programming of the
game, is symptomatic of a personal inner life. Ex hypothesi NC is not one
of these non-playable characters. If some actual human were to try to take
over one of these little persons and make it into a first-person playable
character that would mean the destruction of the DP in question. There
might be something left of the DP, but it would not be a person any longer.
The point is this: To serve as an adequate analogy for a Chalcedonian
Christology, even if video game characters can be persons in their own
right, NC is not a person and never was a person. NC was never an individual substance since, by hypothesis, it exists only as the character
played by N. In our fantasy, video game characters have consciousness
and a will and an intellect. So NC, being a real video game character, has
these things. But it has them only as the character being played by N. So,
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even on our fantasy hypothesis, there is only one person involved in NP.
If it is metaphysically possible that among the constituent parts of NP
there is only one person, albeit a person engaged in an activity involving
additional elements, and N in NP is the same person as NS, we have all
we need for the analogy to succeed. It is true that, by definition, a whole
cannot be a proper part of itself. But N can still be a proper part of NP.
N is not NP, itself, since N is not identical to NP. Most importantly N is a
person whereas NP is an action composite state of affairs. Still, N is the
same person as N in NP.
If this analysis of the situation in NP is plausible, it suggests that there
may be equivocation in the term “God Incarnate.” The term might mean
the action composite, WI, in which case it is a state of affairs, not a person.
W is a part of WI, in that case. Or it might mean the divine person, W in
WI, Who is the source, the main constituent of, and only person in, the
action composite. W simpliciter (WS) considered in Himself, in abstraction from whether or not He assumes a human nature, is not indiscernible
in a Leibnizian sense, from W in WI. WS may or may not involve being
incarnate, while W in WI must. WS is not necessarily part of a composite
which also includes H, whereas W in WI is. But there is no reason to deny
that WS is the same person as W in WI, and a proper part of WI. The Chalcedonian claim is that the Word Incarnate is the Word doing something. It
is the divine person assuming a human soul and body. The Word has two
natures, one per se, and one through the act of assuming. The human soul
and body do not constitute a person in their own right, although other
human individuals are constituted by a human soul and body. The Nick
Playing analogy suggests the metaphysical possibility of such a situation.
If the composite in question is an action composite, then Senor’s conclusion—that the composite theory entails that there must be two persons in
the Incarnation or none—does not follow.
Robin LePoidevin has recently raised similar criticisms against the
composite theory of the Incarnation. He proposes the following argument:
(a) The pre-incarnate divine nature = the incarnate divine nature (since
nothing intrinsic has happened to it).
(b) The pre-incarnate divine nature = the Second Person of the Trinity
(since the three members of the Trinity exhaust its composition, and
nothing else is divine, so only the Second person of the Trinity could
be identical to the divine nature, given that neither the Father nor
the Holy Ghost become incarnate).
(c) The Second Person of the Trinity = Christ (since Christ is the Son
made man).
(d) The Second Person of the Trinity = the incarnate divine nature.
(e) Christ = the incarnate divine nature.
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However, says LePoidevin, “(e) is false, as the divine nature is only part
of Christ.”13
But the problem with composition does not arise if we take the composite in question to be the action composite WI, which “contains” only a
single person, its main constituent, W. We can construct a valid argument
resembling LePoidevin’s, which concludes to (e), where (e) is unproblematically true. In LePoidevin’s argument the term “divine nature” is the
term used to label the divine “part” of Christ which exists as incarnate
and as pre-incarnate.14 This term is confusing in this context in that Father,
Son, and Spirit share one divine nature, but “divine nature” does not refer
to that. Here—as Premise (b) says—the term “divine nature” refers to a
person, the Second Person of the Trinity, the one who assumes human
nature and so could be called “incarnate” or “pre-incarnate.”
The “=” indicates numerical identity; the terms on either side refer to
the numerically same thing, like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.15 On my approach, the term “incarnate divine nature,” that is, the Word Incarnate,
could mean two different things. It might refer to W in WI, the person,
or to WI, the action composite. In order for Premise (a) to be true, we
must take it in the former meaning. In that case (a) states that W, before
assuming H, is numerically the same thing as W in WI. In that W and
W in WI are the same person, that claim, W=W in WI, would be true.
If we take “incarnate divine nature,” the Word incarnate, to refer to the
action composite, WI, then (a) is false. W is a person and WI is a state
of affairs, so W is not numerically the same thing as WI. Premise (b) is
unexceptionable. It says that W = The Second Person of the Trinity. If we
take “Christ” to label the action composite, WI, then (c) is false. It is not
the case that W=WI. The Word assuming human nature is a state of affairs,
not a person. But if we take “Christ,” more plausibly, to refer to the person
who is God assuming human nature, the Son made man, then “Christ”
refers to W in WI. Premise (c) is true if the claim is that W = W in WI since
the Second Person of the Trinity is W, and the Son made man is W in WI.
It is the same as the true version of Premise (a) and is uncontroversial. To
be true, Premise (d) must take “incarnate divine nature” to be W in WI,
and so it, too, says W=W in WI. And (e), then, says that W in WI = W in
WI. LePoidevin’s paradox of composition disappears. God Incarnate is not
a composite person, and Chalcedon never said He was. He is one person
with two natures, but “with” here is entirely consistent with analyzing
the Incarnation as the divine Word assuming human nature. (N in NP
is a boy “with” four hands, two 3-dimensional, meat hands, and two 2dimensional, digital hands.) God Incarnate is a person who brings about,
and hence is the main constituent of, a composite state of affairs, His
being incarnate.
LePoidevin, “Identity and the Composite Christ,” 178.
Ibid.
15
Ibid., 167–168.
13
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IV. The qua Move
A reason to employ the NP analogy, and to think of WI as an action
composite, is that it helps make sense of the qua move in attempting to
ascribe attributes to God Incarnate. If He is one person with two natures,
one divine and one human, shall we say that He is, for example, both
omniscient and limited in knowledge? But that seems contradictory. The
traditional solution says that God Incarnate is omniscient qua divine
and limited in knowledge qua human. But if God Incarnate is only one
person, then it seems that it should be possible to ascribe one, and only
one, of a pair of opposing properties to the unified being. Note that the
properties in question are not properties ascribed to the whole of the action composite, WI. WI is a state of affairs and states of affairs are neither
omniscient nor limited in knowledge. Our question is about the person
who is the main constituent of WI, whose causal activity brings WI into
being and provides the unity in WI, that is the Word who assumes human
nature, W in WI.
Senor, in criticizing Leftow’s defense of the composite theory, takes him
to task for saying that, when it comes to how to assign attributes to God
Incarnate “there is just no uniform rule by which to figure out which part’s
attributes will come to qualify its whole.”16 Given the nature of the composite I have in mind, the issue is not how to qualify “the whole” but how
to qualify the one person who is the main constituent of the composite.
But a case by case approach seems right. I would add, however, that the
cases can be sorted into three kinds. (This is probably over-simplified,
but may be helpful as a schema which could be fruitfully qualified and
developed.) Regarding W in WI, there are properties of a kind which can
be had only by W, properties of a kind which can be had only by H, and
properties which are of a kind such that both W and H have them, but in
differing degrees (and perhaps in very different ways, depending on your
preferred theory of how to talk and think about God). A similar taxonomy
can be applied to properties of N in NP if we allow the science fiction
hypothesis that video game characters have wills and intellects, so start
with N in NP.
There is only one person in NP, and that is N, so the question is this;
what properties can be ascribed to N in NP and how? There are properties
that N in NP has, only in virtue of being N. For example, N in NP can be
holding the game controls only insofar as he is N. NC doesn’t and couldn’t
hold the controls. Suppose that NC has just shot one of the opponent,
non-playable characters in the game. Then N in NP has shot the character.
(At least it is common to ask things like, “Did you shoot that soldier?” of
the boy playing the game, and to find “Yes” an unsurprising answer.) But
N, qua N, isn’t armed and didn’t do any shooting. NC is holding the gun.
True, NC could not take any action, or even exist, if he were not being
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Senor, “Compositional Account,” 66.

THE INCARNATION AS ACTION COMPOSITE

263

played by N. Still, insofar as N in NP does any shooting, he does it qua
NC. Given that NC expresses or represents N in the video game world, the
locution that N acts qua NC—as or in or through NC—seems right. These
are examples of properties that belong to N in NP either as N or as NC,
but which could not belong to both, even in different degrees. NC cannot
hold the game controls even a little bit, and N is unarmed except qua NC.
Similarly with W in WI. There are properties which belong to W in
WI only as W or only as H, but which could not belong to both, even in
differing degrees. The Christian says that “Christ died.” If Christ is God,
then the claim that He is mortal is at least as bizarre as the claim that Nick
is two-dimensional. W per se cannot possibly die. W in WI can be mortal
only because H is part of WI, and the human body can die. So W in WI is
mortal qua H. He can weep and feel sad qua H. Or we might say that W in
WI is omnipresent. Yes, but H is not omnipresent. H is an organic unity
of a human soul and body, and the human body is in a place. (H, as part
of WI, has a great deal more spatial flexibility than you and I, but still, if
H involves a human body, it is in a place.) So W in WI is omnipresent qua
W. In the case of N in NP holding the controls and shooting, and W in WI
being mortal and being omnipresent, we can understand what is meant
by ascribing the property to the person who is the main constituent of the
whole, and it is clear which part of the action composite exhibits the property properly ascribed to the main constituent of the whole qua that part.
The other sort of property is the one which is possessed by the two
parts of our action composites, WI and NP, but in differing degrees. We
can call these “shared” properties. So N and (on our science fiction hypothesis) NC both possess intellects and wills, as do W and H. Given the
ontological distance between God and creation, there is a problem with
how our terms “intellect” and “will” apply to W and H. One might adopt
an analogical approach, or insist upon some underlying univocity. This
difficulty need not affect my points here, so long as it is granted that God
is a knower and an agent where those terms bear some positive meaning
for us.
These sorts of properties pose more of a problem than those where the
property can apply to only one of the pair of parts in that a more robust
sort of opposition is generated. With mortality, for example, it is true that
H is mortal and W simpliciter is not, but since W doesn’t have a body at all
and isn’t the sort of thing that might suffer a physical death, except insofar
as He assumes H, there doesn’t seem to be much of a puzzle. But take the
example of possessing knowledge. W has knowledge and is, in fact, omniscient. H, as a distinct intellect, has knowledge, too. But H’s knowledge
is presumably limited in various ways, including by the human body’s
part in the activity of gathering, processing, and storing information. But
now we have the puzzle of WI, of which the main constituent is a single
person, but which has two concrete parts where one part has unlimited
knowledge and one part has limited knowledge. So is W in WI’s knowledge limited or unlimited or—as seems contradictory—both?
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W is the ontologically superior part of WI. W sustains the existence
of H from moment to moment and is the cause of all that H is or does. It
seems correct, then, to hold that the property as unlimited in W trumps
the property as limited in H. So W in WI should be said to be, for example, omniscient. More specifically, W in WI is omniscient qua W, but W
in WI is not limited in knowledge at all. As an NP analogy for omniscience
consider having internet access. N’s access to the internet trumps NC’s
intrinsic inability to access it—the internet does not exist in the game. I
say “intrinsic” here to allow that NC does have internet access as part of
NP. Suppose that internet access is required to discover some information
which will impact the actions of NC. In order to get into the secret armory,
NC needs to push the brick above the trash barrel, let’s say. Nick can look it
up online and NC then “knows” to push the brick. So in practice NC does
have internet access.17 The digital persons in NGW might well be amazed
at NC’s receiving information “from beyond.” N in NP has internet access
qua N. He has it simpliciter, so it would be incorrect to say that N in NP
lacks internet access qua NC. There is not any sense in which N in NP lacks
internet access. Analogously, W in WI is omniscient, omnipotent, etc. This
conclusion may not help us imagine what the relationship could be like
between the divine and human intellects in WI as subjects of conscious
experience. The fantasy that NC might have an intellect and a will is such
a thin conceit that I don’t know that it can be developed helpfully and so
I do not appeal to it here. However, regarding our failure to grasp WI, I
do not suppose that we mere mortals should expect to be able to imagine
such a thing, so I do not count this as a problem with my proposal.
The critic may hold that my conclusion about the “shared” properties
presents the wrong picture of God Incarnate. On my analysis W in WI just
is omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, etc. But then, the critic may
say, W in WI, the single person in question, does not fit the Chalcedonian
description. He is not, “like us in all respects except for sin.” But what
does “like us in all respects” mean here? It might mean that He is “truly
human” in that He has a human soul and body. W in WI fits the description, in that case. Some take it to mean something like “very similar to most
human beings in most respects” including and especially our limitations.18
But that seems an unlikely understanding. W in WI, though possessed of
a human soul and body, is radically different from most human beings in
most respects. Very few of us walk on water or raise the dead at a word.
Most of us were conceived by human mothers and fathers. For none of the
rest of us does our human body and soul constitute a part of a unity which
also includes a divine person. Chalcedon, in all likelihood, intended to
make the point that there is genuine humanity in God Incarnate against
those who would deny it. But W in WI is really quite an unusual person
and very unlike most of us.
17
18
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But if W in WI is not really subject to all our limitations how can He save
us? There are many theories of atonement, and some focus on the exemplary nature of W in WI’s behavior or on W in WI’s sympathetic feelings.
Adherents of these theories may insist, for example, that W in WI must
have been truly tempted to sin—that is, He must really have wanted to
do the wicked thing, knowing that it is wicked. And that means He must
have believed He could do the wicked thing. If not, then He is not free and
cannot serve as a model for us or really understand our condition.19 I do
not see this. The property of being good is a property shared by W and
H. My proposal is that the perfect and necessary goodness of W trumps
the humanly limited goodness of H, and W in WI should be thought to be
perfectly and necessarily good. The only qualification is that W in WI is
perfectly and necessarily good qua W, but it does not follow that W in WI
is simultaneously limited in goodness qua H. Can we make sense of the
biblical claim that W in WI is tempted? Yes. W in WI can be “tempted” in
that H may get hungry at a time when it would be morally inappropriate
to eat—for example, when it would be obedience to the Devil. But W in WI
cannot truly want to do evil, and He knows He cannot do it. The will of H
wills in concert (however that works) with the will of W.
But if the human will of W in WI wills in concert with the divine will
of W, and W is necessarily good, is that human will not free? Anselm of
Canterbury provides a plausible answer. On Anselm’s account, the core
of freedom is aseity, from-oneself-ness. Your choices must be up to you
in an ultimate way. Created rational persons exist with all their positive
properties in absolute ontological dependence upon the sustaining causal
power of God. But if you, and everything positive about you, come from
God, how can you bear any ultimate responsibility for your choices?20
Anselm’s answer is that sometimes God provides you with competing,
morally significant motivations such that it is up to you which motivation to pursue. Thus, for the created person, morally significant freedom
requires an ability to choose between genuinely open options and this
includes an ability to sin.21 Anselm holds that the situation is different
with God, who exists absolutely a se. He does not need the open options
to secure the proper aseity. God, being perfect, does the best.22 Freedom
for the divine person who is God Incarnate need not entail an ability to
sin. Christ, according to Anselm, chooses “necessarily” from His perfect
divine nature, and yet is free.23 The human soul and body, H, is part of WI,
19
Thomas V. Morris tries to solve the problem of Christ’s being tempted by saying that He
cannot sin, but He doesn’t know He cannot sin; The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1986), 137–162. This seems to import too great a division between the two
minds of Christ.
20
The qualifier “positive” is there because Anselm holds that some negative properties,
such as “being a sinner,” do not come from God.
21
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and belongs to W, the only person in WI. The will of H conforms to the
will of W, but this does not constitute one person’s will conforming to another’s. The will of H is the human will of W. W’s freedom is not grounded
in open options or the possibility of sinning, so there is no need to say that
W in WI might sin, or that H in WI might do so.
Does this mean that the workings of the wills of W and H are so alien
from those of the rest of us that Christ cannot really serve as a role model
for us? Not on the Anselmian account. The human will of Christ is not
different in kind from the wills of other human or angelic persons. Anselm
holds that the angels who held fast to the good when the others fell, and
the blessed in heaven, are incapable of sin. This is because to sin one would
have to be genuinely tempted, and these fortunate created agents can now
see nothing to tempt them. They will only the good, but they are free, and
are praiseworthy for their happy condition, in that they possess it “from
themselves.” It is a consequence of their past choices which, due to the
open options provided by God, exhibited the required aseity.24 The will of
H is unique in that it is the human will of a divine person, not the will of
a human person. But in that it is a human will which is free, yet must will
only the good, it is not unique on the Anselmian view of things.
For W in WI to serve as a role model for us, we need to try to do as He
did. If it is hard for us, since we don’t have the unfair advantage of being
fully God as well as fully man, well, that’s life. If the critic insists that W in
WI must be limited in the ways we are in order to succeed in the work of
atonement, then I respond that there is nothing in Chalcedon to ground
that claim. Anselm, for one, proposes a theory of the atonement which
requires that W in WI be truly God and truly man, but which does not
attribute human limitations to W in WI.
Is my picture of W in WI at odds with the Bible? As I have spelled it out,
for any shared property, the divine instance trumps the human instance
such that it is the divine instance that is properly attributed to the person
who is the main constituent of the whole composite. W in WI is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, etc. But then, the critic may ask, if W in WI
is omnipotent (for example), wouldn’t we expect more striking miracles
than the occasional stroll on the lake or cure of this or that local individual
that we find in the New Testament? No. We have no reason at all to expect
more from W in WI than we get. W existed before the Incarnation (from
our temporal perspective). So, before WI existed, W was an omnipotent,
agent God at work in the universe. The Bible has it that, pre-incarnate, He
produced a miracle now and again to make a point, but otherwise He let
the system of secondary causation proceed in the usual way. He kept it all
in being from moment to moment, but He apparently did not see the need
to produce unusual events with any frequency. If this is how W operates,
why suppose that He must change His mind as W in WI?25
24
25
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But are there not biblical passages where W in WI seems to say that He
is limited? He cannot do things and does not know things? Yes, and there
are passages which seem to entail that W in WI cannot be limited. If, as it
says at the beginning of John’s Gospel, W in WI is indeed the one through
Whom “all things came to be,” and if He is truly “in the world that had
its being through him,” it is hard to see how W in WI can be limited. Or,
at least, it is hard to see if we are committed to the Chalcedonian claims.26
Anybody who takes the Bible seriously grants that many passages are not
to be understood in their more immediate and obvious sense. If we suppose that the passages which suggest limitation are expressions of the H
part of WI, we may grant that H experiences human limitations, without
thereby concluding that W in WI does so. Again, I do not attempt to describe how the divine and human intellects and wills might interact. But
whether or not we can imagine it, such interaction does not seem contradictory, and, given the subject in question, that ought to be good enough
to ground the possibility of God Incarnate.
V. Further Criticisms
The critic might raise a number of further points. For one thing, I have not
spelled out the requirements for personal identity. The critic may say that
even though N and N in NP seem to be the same person, without a theoretical analysis of personal identity it is doubtful whether or not the point
about N and N in NP can be carried over to W and W in WI. I believe,
to the contrary, that a robust theory of personal identity is unnecessary
since, oddly enough, the personal identity of W and W in WI is actually a
simpler matter metaphysically than the identity of N and N in NP. This is
due to the nature of W. If, intuitively, N and N in NP seem to be the same
person, then the possibility of W and W in WI being the same person is
supported without our having to delve into the vexed question of human
personal identity.
The problem of personal identity for human beings arises because we
change, physically and mentally, over time. There must be something
about us which grounds an ascription of sameness over time. Candidates
include (but are not limited to) the continuity of the physical body, the
existence of the same immaterial substance (mind or soul) over time, the
same ground of conscious experience over time, lasting and accessible
memories, or some combination of the above. Different philosophers posit
different criteria, all seem subject to difficulties, and, to date, there is no
consensus. Though it seems an unlikely thesis, some analyses of personal
identity might allow that N is so transformed by becoming part of NP that
he really does cease to be the same person. But with W and W in WI there
is no transformation.
26
In the last couple of centuries kenoticism has been embraced by some. That is the view
that the Son radically limited Himself to become a human being. This position seems at odds
with the texts from John and constitutes a rejection of Chalcedon.
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The God of classical theism is immutable. Though many contemporary philosophers of religion express doubt about this divine attribute, it
was generally accepted among Christian intellectuals for at least the first
millennium and a half of Christianity. The opinion of those attending the
Council of Chalcedon would certainly have been that God is immutable,
and in a very strong sense. It is not that God’s nature stays the same while
His beliefs and actions change. No. God is not subject to time and He does
not change in any way at all.27 God does what He does and thinks what
He thinks in one, immutable act. Since there is no change in God there is
no need to locate some unchanging ground of continuity in an otherwise
changing thing. So there is no problem of divine personal identity. God
just is the person(s) He is.
Note that this point helps address a problem about individuation. With
NP, we may wonder what to say about a case where Nick plays for an
hour or so, then stops playing to do his homework, then comes back to
play for another hour. Is the second instance of Nick playing a part of or
continuation of the first? Are there two separate states of affairs, each of
which look to be properly labeled NP? Must we start indexing instances
of NP to temporal points? All good questions, but happily none of them
arises regarding the Incarnation. W is eternally and immutably W in WI.
The critic may respond that the above point constitutes the classically
minded theist leaping from the frying pan into the fire. If we don’t need
to worry about God’s personal identity because He is immutable, how can
He possibly become Incarnate? Yet again, it is Anselm who offers what I
take to be the most successful answer to this question. Anselm is perhaps
the first philosopher to propose, in a clear and consistent way, that God’s
eternity entails the isotemporal theory of time.28 Isotemporalism holds
that all of time—every moment of what we perceive as past, present, and
future—is equally real. Divine eternity, on this theory, entails that the entire spatio-temporal universe is immediately “present” to God. Thus He
can act and interact as an agent in temporal creation in the one act which
is His nature. It is correct to say that the Word becomes flesh when H comes
into being, but this moment of W in WI’s conception, along with the Crucifixion, the dawn of time and the end of days, is all present immediately
to W. N and N in NP can plausibly be thought of as one and the same
person even though N may sometimes fail to be N in NP. So much more
so can W be thought to be the same person as W in WI given that, from
W’s perspective, He is immutably W in WI.29 It is legitimate, then, to use
our intuitions regarding NP to bolster claims about personal identity and
action composition without proposing a robust theory of what human
personal identity must consist in.
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The critic may mount a different sort of criticism and argue that NP,
as an analogy for the Incarnation, suggests the wrong sort of relationship
between W and H. It might be argued that N uses NC as a sort of instrument by means of which to play, and it is wrong to think of H as an
instrument used by W. Does NP, as an analogy, smack of Apollinarianism,
the position that the Incarnation consists in God as immaterial spirit or mind
controlling a human body in place of a human soul? Chalcedon is clear
that WI involves a human soul and body. Again, I have to admit that my
analogy is distant at best. A closer analogy allows the hypothesis proposed
above that we imagine video game characters possessed of intellect and
will. Perhaps that is enough to mute the charge that my analogy suggests
Apollinarianism. In any case, I am not sure how to develop this possible
criticism about NC being merely an instrument.
Senor posits (in order to later reject) the analogy of “Torso,” a human
being who first lacks limbs and who then can have limbs attached and
still be the same person she was before. He holds that human limbs, in
the Torso analogy, would be more like the human soul and body assumed
by the Word than artificial limbs would be. The artificial limbs are mere
“instruments” and thus cannot be genuine parts of Torso. Human limbs,
on the other hand (so to speak), are of the same type as the rest of Torso’s
body and can be “fully integrated” into Torso.30 Senor seems to be saying
that we should prefer an analysis of the Incarnation which allows H to
become part of W, to be of the same type as W and fully integrated into
W. But we do not want that at all! Chalcedon is clear that the two natures
“undergo no confusion . . . ; at no point was the difference between the
natures taken away through the union.” The critic might note that, in
that quote, the ellipsis after “confusion” replaces “no change, no division, no separation.” But saying that the two natures are not divided or
separated means that they are together, which is not the same as being
integrated if we take “integrated” to mean something like being blended
or fused into a whole, which is what Senor’s analogy suggests. One of
the main targets of Chalcedon was Eutyches, who had held that there
are two natures before the union but one afterwards. But the Council
emphatically denied that the two become one nature. NC cannot possibly be “integrated” into N, but I do not see that that contradicts the
proposal that NP is a unified action composite mainly constituted by N,
and I do not see that NC’s status is so “instrumental” as to make it inapt
as a (distant!) analogy for H.
Perhaps what Senor is suggesting is that it is a mistake to allow that H
is something like an instrument analogous to the marionette (M) in the action composite JM. There the marionette was something which Jim could
pick up or put down. Since M is what it is with or without being part of
JM, it has a nature which can be divided and separated from the nature
of J in JM. But that is an advantage of NP as an analogy for WI. NC does
30
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not exist except as part of NP, so it cannot be divided or separated from
N. Similarly, H exists only as part of WI. Could it be a problem that in NP
almost all of the causal action comes from the side of N and so NC is passive in comparison, suggesting that H is passive and hence a mere object?
But the fact is that all the causal power in WI does come from W. It does
not follow that H is a “mere object” in some problematic way, does it?
Is the suggestion that, if NC is something like an instrument, then, analogously, H is not a real human being? I do not see how that criticism is to
be developed. NC is a real character in the game. If video game characters
have intellects and wills, then so does NC. If the non-playable characters
are actual digital persons with reason and conscious perceptions, then they
see NC as just another one of them—except when he produces a miracle.
When that happens, they may realize that NC is a very unusual character
and may get some thin inkling of N, the transcendent part of NP. Similarly,
though H is part of WI, this need not undermine the claim that H is a real
human soul and body with a human intellect and will. Of course H per se is
not a person. H exists only as part of WI, so H is the human soul and body
of a person, it’s just that the person is W, the only person there is in WI.
The Council of Chalcedon held that Scripture and tradition required
the very difficult doctrine that God “became man,” a single person with
a divine and a human nature. The video game analogy provides one way
of thinking about the Chalcedonian doctrine which supports the modest
claim that it is not metaphysically impossible. Traditionally, Christian
philosophers have held that God can do whatever is not impossible for
a perfect and unlimited being to do. If becoming Incarnate is how God
chooses to save us, then, bizarre as it seems, He can do it.31
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